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Abstract. Identity based encryption (IBE) schemes have been flourishing since the very beginning
of this century. In IBE it is widely believed that proving the security of a scheme in the sense of IND-
ID-CCA2 is sufficient to claim the scheme is also secure in the senses of both SS-ID-CCA2 and NM-
ID-CCA2. The justification for this belief is the relations among indistinguishability (IND), semantic
security (SS) and non-malleability (NM). But these relations are proved only for conventional public
key encryption (PKE) schemes in historical works. The fact is that between IBE and PKE , there
exists a difference of special importance, i.e. only in IBE the adversaries can perform a particular
attack, namely the chosen identity attack.
This paper shows that security proved in the sense of IND-ID-CCA2 is validly sufficient for implying
security in any other sense in IBE . This is to say the security notion, IND-ID-CCA2, captures the
essence of security for all IBE schemes. To achieve this intention, we first describe formal definitions
of the notions of security for IBE , and then present the relations among IND, SS and NM in IBE ,
along with rigorous proofs. All of these results are proposed with the consideration of the chosen
identity attack.
Key words: notions of security, identity based encryption schemes, equivalences, implications, chosen
identity attacks.
1 Introduction
Identity based encryption (IBE) is a public key encryption mechanism where an arbitrary string, such
as the recipient’s identity, can serve as a public key. This convenience yields the avoidance of the need
to distribute public key certificates. On the other hand, in conventional public key encryption (PKE)
schemes, it is unavoidable to access the online public key directory in order to obtain the public keys.
IBE schemes are largely motivated by many applications such as to encrypt emails with the recipient’s
email address.
Although the basic concept of IBE was proposed by Shamir [14] about two decades ago, it is only
very recent that the first fully functional scheme was proposed [5]. In 2001, Boneh and Franklin defined
a security model and gave the first fully functional solution provably secure in the random oracle model.
The notions of security proposed in their work are natural extensions to the standard ones for PKE ,
namely indistinguishability-based ones.
1.1 Motivation
So far in the literature, the security notion, IND-ID-CCA2, is widely considered to be the “right” one which
captures the essence of security for IBE [2–5, 13, 16]. However, such an issue has not been investigated
rigorously, yet. This work aims to establish such an affirmative justification. Before discussing about how
to define the “right” security notion for IBE , we first glance back to the case of PKE .
Notions of Security for PKE . A convenient way to formalize notions of security for cryptographic
schemes is considering combinations of the various security goals and possible attack models. Three essen-
tial security goals being considered in the case of PKE are indistinguishability (IND), semantic security
(SS) [11], and non-malleability (NM) [7], i.e. Gi ∈ {IND,SS,NM}. The attack models are chosen plaintext
attack (CPA) [11], non-adaptive chosen ciphertext attack (CCA1) [7] and adaptive chosen ciphertext at-
tack (CCA2) [12], i.e. Aj ∈ {CPA,CCA1,CCA2}. 1 Their combinations give nine security notions for PKE ,
e.g. IND-CCA2.
SS is widely accepted as the natural goal of encryption scheme because it formalizes an adversary’s
inability to obtain any information about the plaintext from a given the ciphertext. The equivalence
between SS-CPA and IND-CPA has been given [11]; and the equivalences between SS-CCA1,2 and IND-
CCA1,2 are given only recently [10,15]. On the other hand, NM formalizes an adversary’s inability, given
a challenge ciphertext y∗, to output a different ciphertext y′ in such a way that the plaintexts x, x′,
underlying these two ciphertexts, are meaningfully related, e.g. x′ = x+ 1. The implications from IND-
CCA2 to NM under any attack have been proved [1]. For these reasons, along with the convenience of
proving security in sense of IND, in almost all concrete schemes, IND-CCA2 is considered to be the “right”
standard security notion for PKE .
Towards Defining Notions of Security for IBE . Due to the particular mechanism, the adversaries
are granted more power in IBE than in PKE . Essentially, the adversaries can access to the key extraction
oracle, which answers the private key of any queried public key (identity). Including this particular
adaptive chosen identity attack, 2 we formalize the security notions for IBE , e.g. IND-ID-CCA2, in such
a way: Gi-ID-Aj , where Gi ∈ {IND,SS,NM}, ID denotes the particular attack mentioned above, and
Aj ∈ {CPA,CCA1,CCA2}. Boneh and Franklin are the first to define the security notion for IBE , by
naturally extending IND-CCA2 to IND-ID-CCA2.
Let us rigorously investigate whether IND-ID-CCA2 could be considered as the “right” notion for IBE ,
besides the intuitive reason that it is analogous to IND-CCA2. The natural approach to justify such an
appropriateness for IBE is, analogously to the case of PKE , to (i) first define SS and NM based security
notions for IBE , (ii) and then establish the relations among the above security notions: to be more
specific, the implications from IND-ID-CCA2 to all the other notions, i.e. IND-ID-CCA2 is the strongest
notion of security for IBE
At the first place the intuition tells us that task (i) seems to be simply achievable by considering the
analogy to the case of shifting IND-CCA to IND-ID-CCA as done in [5], and task (ii) could immediately
follow from the relations among the notions as the case of PKE , since we shift all the notions with the
same additional attack power (namely, the accessability to key extraction oracle). However, we emphasize
that it will not follow simply and immediately until rigorous definitions for task (i) and rigorous proofs
for task (ii) are presented.
We managed to accomplish both tasks in this paper. This kind of result can be considered as having
the same flavor as some historical results, to name just one, the equivalence between IND-CCA2 and
SS-CCA2 for PKE . There, although IND-CPA and SS-CPA were defined and proved equivalent in the
year 1984 [11], the equivalence between IND-CCA2 and SS-CCA2 had not been proved rigorously until
the year 2003 [15]. During this long period of time, people just simply believed that shifting the attack
power from CPA to CCA2 will not affect the equivalence.
1 We give the details of these attack models in Appendix A.
2 Actually in IBE there exists the other attack against identity, named selective chosen identity attack. In this
paper we omit presenting the formal definitions of the security notions in this selective-ID secure sense because
these notions are too weak. More details about selective chosen identity attack are given in Appendix B.
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Fig. 1. Relations among the notions of security for IBE
1.2 Our Contributions
Our contributions are twofold. First, we formally presented the definitions of the notions of security for
IBE schemes. The overall definitions are built upon historical works [1, 5, 10].
Second, we rigorously proved the relations among these notions and achieved our conclusion that,
IND-ID-CCA2 is the “right” notion of security for IBE . It turns out that our intuition about those
relations were right: the implication G1-ID-A1 ⇒ G2-ID-A2 will hold in IBE if and only if G1-A1 ⇒ G2-A2
holds in PKE , where the corresponding security goals Gi and attack models Aj are mentioned above.
The results of our second contribution is illustrated in Figure 1. The vertical line arrows represent
implications which are explicitly proven, and the horizontal dots arrows represent s implication which
are self-evident. No matter in which case, an arrow from notion A to notion B denotes that, if an identity
based encryption scheme is secure in the sense of A then it is also secure in the sense of B. The scripted
number beside an arrow denotes that in which theorem or lemma this implication is proved.
Related Work. Independently of our work, Galindo and Hasuo have shown similar results in their
manuscript [8]. The relation between these works is that, they have not publicly announced their result
yet by the time when this version of our draft is finished, while a previous version of this work has been
publicly announced in Technical Report of IEICE [17].
1.3 Organization
The rest of the paper is organized as follows: in Section 2 we review the formal definition of IBE schemes
and several other basic terms. In Section 3 we define the formal definitions of notions of security for IBE
schemes. In Section 4 we prove important relations among these notions, rigorously.
2 Preliminary
In this section, we review the model of IBE and define some notations.
2.1 Identity Based Encryption
Formally, an identity based encryption scheme consists of four algorithms, i.e. IBE = (S,X , E ,D), where
– S, the setup algorithm, takes a security parameter k and outputs system parameters param and
master-keymk. The system parameters include a description of a message spaceM, and a description
of a ciphertext space C. The system parameters should be publicly known, while the mk should be
known only by the “Private Key Generator” (PKG).
– X , the extract algorithm, takes triple inputs as param,mk, and an arbitrary id ∈ {0, 1}∗, and outputs
a private key sk = E(param,mk, id). Here id is arbitrary and will be used as the public encryption
key. sk is the corresponding private decryption key. Intuitively, this algorithm extracts the private
key from a given public key.
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– E , the encrypt algorithm, takes triple inputs as param, id ∈ {0, 1}∗ and a plaintext x ∈ M. It
outputs the corresponding ciphertext y ∈ C.
– D, the decrypt algorithm, takes triple inputs as param, y ∈ C, and the corresponding private key sk.
It outputs x ∈M.
The four algorithms must satisfy the standard consistency constraint, i.e. if and only if sk is the
private key generated by the extract algorithm with the given id as the public key, then,
∀x ∈M : D(param, sk, y) = x, where y = E(param, id, x)
2.2 Conventions
Notations.
⇀
x← D(param, sk,⇀y ) denotes that the vector ⇀x is made up of the plaintexts corresponding
to every ciphertext in the vector
⇀
y . Mˆ denotes a subset of message spaceM, where the elements of Mˆ
are distributed according to the distribution designated by some algorithm. Function h : Mˆ → {0, 1}∗
denotes the a-priori partial information about the plaintext and function f : Mˆ → {0, 1}∗ denotes the
a-posteriori partial information.
Non-negligible Function. We say a function  : N → R is negligible if for every constant c ≥ 0 there
exits an integer kc such that (k) ≥ k−c for all k ≥ kc.
R-related Relation.We consider R-related relation of arity t where t will be polynomial in the security
parameter k. Rather than writing R(x1, x2, . . . , xt) we write R(x,
⇀
x), denoting the first argument is
special and the rest are bunched into a vector
⇀
x where
∣∣ ⇀x ∣∣ = t−1, and for every xi ∈⇀x, R(x, xi) holds.
Experiments. Let A be a probabilistic algorithm, and let A(x1, . . . , xn; r) be the result of running A on
inputs (x1, . . . , xn) and coins r. Let y ← A(x1, . . . , xn) denote the experiment of picking r at random and
let y be A(x1, . . . , xn; r). If S is a finite set then let x ← S denote the operation of picking an element
at random and uniformly from S. And sometimes we use x R← S in order to stress this randomness. If α
is neither an algorithm nor a set then let x ← α denote a simple assignment statement. We say that y
can be output by A(x1, . . . , xn) if there is some r such that A(x1, . . . , xn; r) = y.
3 Definitions of Security Notions for IBE schemes
Let A = (A1, A2) be an adversary, and we say A is polynomial time if both probabilistic algorithm A1
and probabilistic algorithm A2 are polynomial time. At the first stage, given the system parameters,
the adversary computes and outputs a challenge template τ . A1 can output some state information s
which will be transferred to A2. At the second stage the adversary is issued a challenge ciphertext y∗
generated from τ by a probabilistic function, in a manner depending on the goal. We say the adversary
A successfully breaks the scheme if she achieves her goal.
We consider three security goals, IND, SS and NM. And we consider three attack models, ID-CPA,ID-
CCA1,ID-CCA2, in order of increasing strength. The difference among the models is whether or not A1
or A2 is granted accesses to decryption oracles. 3
We describe in Table 1 and 2 the ability with which the adversary in different attack models accesses
the Extraction Oracle X (param,mk, ·), the Encryption Oracle E(param, id, ·) and the Decryption Oracle
D(param, sk, ·) .
When we say Oi = {XOi, EOi,DOi} = {X (param,mk, ·), E(param, id, ·),ε}, where i ∈ {1, 2}, we
mean DOi is a function that returns a empty string ε on any input.
3 Inspecting the similarity between adaptive chosen identity attack and selective chosen identity attack, we
only discuss in details the former case (full-ID security), while the results can be extended to the latter case
(selective-ID security), since the strategies are similar. Roughly speaking, the target public key id should be
decided by the adversary in advance, before the challenger runs the setup algorithm. The restriction is that
the extraction query on id is prohibited.
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Table 1. Oracle Set O1 in the Definitions of the Notions for IBE
O1 = {XO1, EO1,DO1}
ID-CPA {X (param,mk, ·), E(param, id, ·), ε}
ID-CCA1 {X (param,mk, ·), E(param, id, ·),D(param, sk, ·)}
ID-CCA2 {X (param,mk, ·), E(param, id, ·),D(param, sk, ·)}
Table 2. Oracle Set O2 in the Definitions of the Notions for IBE
O2 = {XO2, EO2,DO2}
ID-CPA {X (param,mk, ·), E(param, id, ·), ε}
ID-CCA1 {X (param,mk, ·), E(param, id, ·), ε}
ID-CCA2 {X (param,mk, ·), E(param, id, ·),D(param, sk, ·)}
Remark 1. To have meaningful definitions, we insist that the target public key id should not be previously
queried on, i.e. it is completely meaningless if the adversary has already known the corresponding private
key of id.
3.1 Indistinguishability
This significant notion of security for IBE is described by Boneh and Franklin [5] with a distinguishing
game. Here we define indistinguishability through a two-stage experiment. A1 is run on the system
parameters param as input. At the end of A1’s execution she outputs (x0, x1, s, id), such that x0 and x1
are plaintexts with the same length, s is state information (possibly including param) which she wants
to preserve, and id is the public key which she wants to attack. One of x0 and x1 is randomly selected,
say xb, beyond adversary’s view. A challenge y∗ is computed by encrypting xb with the public key id.
A2 tries to distinguish y∗ was the encryption of x0 or x1.
Definition 1 (IND-ID-CPA, IND-ID-CCA1, IND-ID-CCA2).
Let IBE = (S,X , E ,D) be an identity based encryption scheme and let A = (A1, A2) be an adversary.
For atk ∈ {id-cpa,id-cca1,id-cca2} and k ∈ N let,
Advind-atkIBE,A (k) = Pr[Exp
ind-atk-1
IBE,A (k) = 1]− Pr[Expind-atk-0IBE,A (k) = 1] (1)
where, for b, d ∈ {0, 1} and |x0| = |x1|,
Experiment Expind-atk-bIBE,A (k)
(param,mk)← S(k);
(x0, x1, s, id)← AO11 (param);
y∗ ← E(param, id, xb);
d← AO22 (x0, x1, s, y∗, id);
return d
We say that IBE is secure in the sense of IND-ATK, if Advind-atkIBE,A (k) is negligible for any A.
3.2 Semantic Security
Semantic security (for PKE) was introduced by Goldwasser and Micali [11] and later refined by Gol-
dreich [9]. It captures the security requirement such that intercepting the ciphertext gives an adversary
no useful information. We can naturally extend it to the case of IBE . A1 is given param, and outputs
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(Mˆ, h, f, s, id). Here the distribution of Mˆ is designated by A1, and (Mˆ, h, f) is the challenge template
τ . A2 receives an encryption y∗ of a random message x∗ drawn from Mˆ. The adversary then outputs
a value v. She hopes that v = f(x∗). The adversary is successful if she can do this with a probability
significantly more than any simulator does. The simulator tries to do as well as the adversary without
knowing the challenge ciphertext y∗ nor accessing to any oracle.
Definition 2 (SS-ID-CPA, SS-ID-CCA1, SS-ID-CCA2).
Let IBE = (S,X , E ,D) be an identity based encryption scheme, let A = (A1, A2) be an adversary, and
let A′ = (A′1, A
′
2) be the simulator. For atk ∈ {id-cpa,id-cca1,id-cca2} and k ∈ N let,
Advss-atkIBE,A,A′(k) = Pr[Exp
ss-atk
IBE,A(k) = 1]− Pr[Expss-atkIBE,A′(k) = 1] (2)
where, for b ∈ {0, 1},
Experiment Expss-atkIBE,A(k) Experiment Exp
ss-atk
IBE,A′(k)
(param,mk)← S(k); (Mˆ, h, f, s, id)← A′1(k);
(Mˆ, h, f, s, id)← AO11 (param); x∗ R← Mˆ;
x∗ R← Mˆ; v ← A′2(s, |x∗|, h(x∗), id);
y∗ ← E(param, id, x∗); if v = f(x∗)
v ← AO22 (s, y∗, h(x∗), id); then d← 1 else d← 0;
if v = f(x∗) return d
then d← 1 else d← 0;
return d
We say that IBE is secure in the sense of SS-ATK, if for any adversary A there exists a simulator
such that Advss-atkIBE,A(k) is negligible .
We comment here that it is necessary to require in both cases τ is distributed identically, since both
A and A′ generate target public key id by themselves, i.e. τ is output by A and A′ themselves.
3.3 Non-malleability
Non-malleability is introduced by Dolev et al. [7]. It roughly requires that an adversary, given a challenge
ciphertext, cannot modify it into another, different ciphertext in such a way that the plaintexts under-
lying the two ciphertexts are meaningfully related. A1 is given param, and outputs a triple (Mˆ, s, id).
A2 receives an encryption y∗ of a random message x1 drawn from Mˆ. The adversary then outputs a
description of a relation R and a vector
⇀
y of ciphertexts. We insist that y 6∈⇀y . 4 The adversary hopes
that R(x1,
⇀
x) holds. We say she is successful if, she can do this with a probability significantly more than
that, with which R(x0,
⇀
x) holds. Here x0 is also a plaintext chosen uniformly from Mˆ, independently of
x1.
Definition 3 (NM-ID-CPA, NM-ID-CCA1, NM-ID-CCA2).
Let IBE = (S,X , E ,D) be an identity based encryption scheme and let A = (A1, A2) be an adversary.
For atk ∈ {id-cpa,id-cca1,id-cca2} and k ∈ N let,
Advnm-atkIBE,A(k) = Pr[Exp
nm-atk-1
IBE,A (k) = 1]− Pr[Expnm-atk-0IBE,A (k) = 1] (3)
where, for b ∈ {0, 1} and |x0| = |x1|,
4 The adversary is prohibited from performing copying the challenge ciphertext y∗. Otherwise, she could output
the equality relation R, where R(a, b) holds if and only if a = b, and output
⇀
y= {y∗}, and be successful,
always.
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Experiment Expnm-atk-bIBE,A (k)
(param,mk)← S(k);
(Mˆ, s, id)← AO11 (param);
x0, x1
R← Mˆ;
y∗ ← E(param, id, x1);
(R,
⇀
y )← AO22 (s, y∗, id);
⇀
x← D(param, id,⇀y );
if y 6∈⇀y ∧ ⊥ 6∈⇀x ∧ R(xb,⇀x)
then d← 1 else d← 0;
return d
We say that IBE is secure in the sense of NM-ATK, if Advnm-atkIBE,A(k) is negligible for any A.
4 Relations among the Notions of Security for IBE Schemes
In this section, we show that security proved in the sense of IND-ID-CCA2 is validly sufficient for implying
security in any other sense in IBE . We first extend the relatoin (equivalence) between IND-ATK and SS-
ATK into IBE environment, and then extend the relation between IND-ATK and NM-ATK into IBE
environment. It relies on these relations that the researches on identity based encryption schemes are
blossoming over past several years, thus we say these relations are significantly important.
4.1 Equivalence between IND and SS
Theorem 1 (IND-ATK ⇔ SS-ATK). A scheme IBE is secure in the sense of IND-ATK if and only if
IBE is secure in the sense of SS-ATK, for any attack ATK ∈ {ID-CPA,ID-CCA1,ID-CCA2}.
We prove this theorem by proving two directions respectively, i.e. IND-ATK implies SS-ATK and
SS-ATK implies IND-ATK.
Lemma 2 (IND-ATK ⇒ SS-ATK) If a scheme IBE is secure in the sense of IND-ATK then IBE is
secure in the sense of SS-ATK, for any attack ATK ∈ {ID-CPA,ID-CCA1,ID-CCA2}.
Main Idea of Proof. According to the definition of SS, in order to prove the scheme is secure in the sense
of SS-ATK, we show that for any SS-ATK adversary B, a corresponding simulator B′ can be constructed
with oracle access to B, such that, B′ can do as well as B in SS-ATK game. In order to calculate how
well the constructed simulator B′ can do, we first construct an IND-ATK adversary A with oracle access
to B, and show Advss-atkIBE,B,B′(k) is equal to Adv
ind-atk
IBE,A (k). Since the scheme is secure in the IND-ATK
sense, no matter which B is accessed as oracle, the advantage, Advind-atkIBE,A (k), of A to break the scheme
is always negligible. Thus we claim that the advantage, Advss-atkIBE,B,B′(k) of B to break the scheme is also
negligible, i.e. B′ can do as well as B. This is to say the scheme is secure in the SS-ATK sense. The point
is how we prove the advantage of A in IND-ATK game is equal to the advantage of B in SS-ATK game.
Proof. Let B′ = (B′1, B
′
2), B = (B1, B2) and A = (A1, A2) be SS-ATK simulator, SS-ATK adversary and
IND-ATK adversary, respectively. In our construction, both adversary B and adversary A have access to
an oracle set O1 at their first stage and an oracle set O2 at their second stage, while simulator B′ have
no access to any oracle. The compositions of these oracle sets are represented in Section 3.
The SS-ATK simulator B′ is constructed as follows:
Algorithm B′1(k) Algorithm B
′
2(s, |x∗|, h(x∗), id)
(param,mk)← S(k); x′ R← Mˆ where |x′| = |x∗|;
(Mˆ, h, f, s, id)← BO11 (param); y′ ← E(param, id, x′);
return (Mˆ, h, f, s, id) v ← BO22 (s, y′, h(x∗), id);
return v
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The point that must be emphasized is, since the challenge template τ = (Mˆ, h, f) is chosen by B
and B′ themselves, τ is distributed identically in both cases . Thus B′1 is likely to start by generating
(mk, param)← S(k), where param is the same as the system parameters given to B1.
We comment that the generated master-key mk allows B′ not only to simulate the extraction orale,
but also to extract the secret key sk corresponding to the target public key id. In this way B′ is able to
simulate the encryption oracle and decryption oracle as well.
In order to calculate how well the simulator B′ does, we construct an IND-ATK adversary A, and
show Advss-atkIBE,B,B′(k) is equal to Adv
ind-atk
IBE,A (k).
Algorithm AO11 (param) Algorithm A
O2
2 (x0, x1, s
′, y∗, id)
(Mˆ, h, f, s, id)← BO11 (param); where s′ = (s, h)
x0, x1 ← Mˆ; v ← BO22 (s, y∗, h(x1), id);
s′ ← (s, h); if v = f(x1) then d← 1 else d← 0;
return (x0, x1, s′, id) return d
Note in the experiment Expss-atkIBE,B′(k), the simulator B
′ invokes the SS-ATK adversary B with a
dummy encryption y′. This experiment finally outputs 1 only when B captures a-posteriori partial
information from this dummy encryption. On the other hand, in the experiment Expind-atk-0IBE,A (k), the
adversary IND-ATK A is challenged with the ciphertext y∗ corresponding to x0, invokes B with the
a-priori partial information h(x1), and finally outputs 1 only when the SS-ATK adversary B captures
a-posteriori partial information f(x1) of x1. So we say in this situation, the encryption y∗ is also dummy
for B. Hence,
Pr[Expind-atk-0IBE,A (k) = 1] = Pr[Exp
ss-atk
IBE,B′(k) = 1] (4)
In contrast, in the experiment Expind-atk-1IBE,A (k) the IND-ATK adversary A is challenged with the
ciphertext y∗ corresponding to x1. Focusing on our construction of A, it is obvious that, this experiment
outputs 1 only when B captures a-posteriori partial information from this useful (not dummy any more)
encryption, i.e. at the end of B’s second stage B outputs v and v = f(x1). Hence,
Pr[Expind-atk-1IBE,A (k) = 1] = Pr[Exp
ss-atk
IBE,B(k) = 1] (5)
We obtain
Advind-atkIBE,A (k)
(1)= Pr[Expind-atk-1IBE,A (k) = 1]− Pr[Expind-atk-0IBE,A (k) = 1]
(2)= Pr[Expss-atkIBE,B(k) = 1] − Pr[Expss-atkIBE,B′(k) = 1]
(3)= Advss-atkIBE,B,B′(k)
The equations (1)= and (3)= are according to the definitions of advantages in IND (1) and SS (2), respec-
tively. And the equation (2)= holds according to Eq. (4) (5).
Since IBE is secure in the IND-ATK sense we know that for the adversary A constructed by any
B Advind-atkIBE,A (k) is negligible, and hence for any B, Adv
ss-atk
IBE,B,B′(k) is negligible too. Thus we say the
constructed simulator B′ does as well as any adversary B. This concludes the proof of Lemma 2. uunionsq
Lemma 3 (SS-ATK ⇒ IND-ATK) If a scheme IBE is secure in the sense of SS-ATK then IBE is
secure in the sense of IND-ATK, for any attack ATK ∈ {ID-CPA,ID-CCA1,ID-CCA2}.
Main idea of Proof. Towards contradiction, we prove that if a scheme is not secure in the IND-ATK sense,
then it is not secure in the SS-ATK as well. We first assume there exists an IND-ATK adversary B who
can successfully break IND-ATK with non-negligible advantage, then we show that we can construct an
SS-ATK adversary A who can successfully break SS-ATK with non-negligible advantage, i.e. there does
not exist any SS-ATK simulator who can do as well as A. We do this by allowing A to call B as an oracle.
Proof. Let A = (A1, A2) and B = (B1, B2) be SS-ATK adversary and IND-ATK adversary respectively.
A is constructed as follows:
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Algorithm AO11 (param) Algorithm A
O2
2 (s, y
∗, h(x1), id)
(x0, x1, s, id)← BO11 (param); d′ ← BO22 (x0, x1, s, y∗, id);
Mˆ ← {x0, x1}U ; v ← d′;
choose f satisfies f(x0) = 0 and f(x1) = 1; return v
choose h satisfies h(x0) = h(x1) ;
return (Mˆ, h, f, s, id)
Since either x0 or x1 is chosen at a probability of 1/2, we obtain
Pr[b = 0] = Pr[b = 1] =
1
2
(6)
Pr[Expind-atk-0IBE,B (k) = 0] = Pr[Exp
ind-atk-1
IBE,B (k) = 1] (7)
Recalling the definition of advantages in IND-ATK (1), we obtain
Advind-atkIBE,B (k) = Pr[Exp
ind-atk-1
IBE,B (k) = 1]− Pr[Expind-atk-0IBE,B (k) = 1]
= 2 · Pr[Expind-atk-1IBE,B (k) = 1]− 1 (8)
Furthermore, focusing on our construction, we obtain
Pr[Expss-atkIBE,A(k) = 1] = Pr[b = 0] · Pr[Expind-atk-0IBE,B (k) = 0]
+ Pr[b = 1] · Pr[Expind-atk-1IBE,B (k) = 1]
(1)= Pr[Expind-atk-1IBE,B (k) = 1]
(2)=
1
2
+
1
2
·Advind-atkIBE,B (k) (9)
Here the equation (1)= holds according to Eq. (6) (7). The equation (2)= holds according to Eq. (8).
On the other hand, recall the definition of SS-ATK (on Page 6). Since the challenge template τ should
be distributed identically in both cases, we observe that at the second stage of the simulator, the input
values
(
s, |x∗|, h(x∗), id) are independent of the event x∗ = xb, where b is chosen at random and uniformly
in {0, 1}. Hence for any simulator,
Pr[Expss-atkIBE,A′(k) = 1] ≤
1
2
(10)
This means that A′ cannot be successful at a probability more than 1/2. In this inequation the
equality holds in case A′ always outputs a value in {0, 1}.
According to the definition of advantage in SS-ATK (2) and Eq. (9) and inequality (10), we obtain
Advss-atkIBE,A,A′(k) = Pr[Exp
ss-atk
IBE,A(k) = 1]− Pr[Expss-atkIBE,A′(k) = 1]
≥ 1
2
·Advind-atkIBE,B (k)
We have assumed that Advind-atkIBE,B (k) is non-negligible, thus Adv
ss-atk
IBE,A,A′(k) is also non-negligible.
We reach a contradiction to the hypothesis that IBE is secure in the SS-ATK sense. Thus IBE is also
secure in the IND-ATK sense. This concludes the proof of Lemma 3. uunionsq
Proof of Theorem 1. From Lemma 2 and 3, Theorem 1 is proven immediately. 
4.2 Relations between IND and NM
Theorem 4 (IND-ID-CCA2 ⇒ NM-ID-CCA2). If a scheme IBE is secure in the sense of IND-ID-
CCA2 then IBE is secure in the sense of NM-ID-CCA2.
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Table 3. Definitions of p(i, j) for i, j ∈ {0, 1}
R(x0,
⇀
x) R(x1,
⇀
x) Probability
whether false false p(0, 0)
R(xb,
⇀
x) true false p(1, 0)
holds false true p(0, 1)
or not true true p(1, 1)
Main idea of Proof. Towards contradiction, we prove that if a scheme is not secure in the NM-ID-CCA2
sense, then it is not secure in the IND-ID-CCA2 as well. We first assume there exists an NM-ID-CCA2
adversary B who can successfully break NM-ID-CCA2 with non-negligible advantage, then we show that
we can construct an IND-ID-CCA2 adversary A who can successfully break IND-ID-CCA2 with non-
negligible advantage. We do this by allowing A to call B as an oracle.
Proof. Let A = (A1, A2) and B = (B1, B2) be IND-ID-CCA2 adversary and NM-ID-CCA2 adversary
respectively.
A is constructed as follows:
Algorithm AO11 (param) Algorithm A
O2
2 (x0, x1, s
′, id, y∗)
(Mˆ, s, id)← BO11 (param); where s′ = (Mˆ, s)
x0 ← Mˆ;x1 ← Mˆ; (R,⇀y )← BO22 (s, y∗, id);
s′ ← (Mˆ, s); ⇀x← D(param, id,⇀y );
return (x0, x1, s′, id) if R(x0,
⇀
x) ∧ ¬R(x1,⇀x) then d← 0;
else if ¬R(x0,⇀x) ∧R(x1,⇀x) then d← 1;
else d
R← {0, 1}U ;
return d
Focusing on our construction we observe,
Advind-id-cca2IBE,A (k)
(1)= Pr[Expind-id-cca2-1IBE,A (k) = 1]− Pr[Expind-id-cca2-0IBE,A (k) = 1]
(2)=
∣∣∣ [ p(0, 1) + 1
2
· ( p(0, 0) + p(1, 1) )]
−
[
p(1, 0) +
1
2
· ( p(0, 0) + p(1, 1) )] ∣∣∣
=
∣∣∣ p(0, 1)− p(1, 0) ∣∣∣
Advnm-id-cca2IBE,B (k)
(3)= Pr[Expnm-id-cca2-1IBE,B (k) = 1]− Pr[Expnm-id-cca2-0IBE,B (k) = 1]
(4)=
∣∣∣ ( p(0, 1) + p(1, 1) )− ( p(1, 0) + p(1, 1) ) ∣∣∣
=
∣∣∣ p(0, 1)− p(1, 0) ∣∣∣
Here, the notations p(i, j), where i, j ∈ {0, 1}, are defined in Table 3. In this way we obtain the
equations (2)= and (4)=. And the equations (1)= and (3)= are according to the definitions of advantages in IND
(1) and NM (3), respectively. Hence,
Advind-id-cca2IBE,A (k) = Adv
nm-id-cca2
IBE,B (k)
Under the assumption thatAdvnm-id-cca2IBE,B (k) is non-negligible,Adv
ind-id-cca2
IBE,A (k) is also non-negligible.
We reach a contradiction to the hypothesis that IBE is secure in the IND-ID-CCA2 sense. Thus IBE is
also secure in the NM-ID-CCA2 sense. This concludes the proof of Theorem 4. uunionsq
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Theorem 5 (NM-ATK ⇒ IND-ATK). If a scheme IBE is secure in the sense of NM-ATK then IBE
is secure in the sense of IND-ATK, for any attack ATK ∈ {ID-CPA,ID-CCA1,ID-CCA2}.
Main idea of Proof. Towards contradiction, we prove that if a scheme is not secure in the IND-ATK
sense, then it is not secure in the NM-ATK as well. We first assume exists an IND-ATK adversary B who
can successfully break IND-ATK with non-negligible advantage, then we show that we can construct an
NM-ATK adversary A who can successfully break NM-ATK with non-negligible advantage. We do this by
allowing A to call B as an oracle.
Proof. Let A = (A1, A2) and B = (B1, B2) be NM-ATK adversary and IND-ATK adversary respectively.
A is constructed as follows:
Algorithm AO11 (param) Algorithm A
O2
2 (Mˆ, s′, y∗, id)
(x0, x1, s, id)← BO11 (param); where s′ = (x0, x1, s)
Mˆ ← {x0, x1}U ; d← BO22 (x0, x1, s, id, y∗);
s′ ← (x0, x1, s); y′ ← E(param, id, (xd + 1));
return (Mˆ, s′, id) ⇀y← {y′};
return (R,
⇀
y )
where R(a, b) = 1 iff a+ 1 = b
In A1 the notation Mˆ ← {x0, x1}U denotes that Mˆ is being assigned the probability space which assigns
to each of x0 and x1 a probability of 1/2.
Inspecting either x0 or x1 was randomly chosen with a probability of 1/2, and recalling the definitions
of advantages in IND (1) and NM (3), we obtain
Pr[b = 0] = Pr[b = 1] =
1
2
(11)
Pr[Expind-atk-0IBE,B (k) = 0] = Pr[Exp
ind-atk-1
IBE,B (k) = 1] (12)
Pr[Expind-atk-0IBE,B (k) = 1] = Pr[Exp
ind-atk-1
IBE,B (k) = 0] (13)
Furthermore, focusing on our construction, we obtain
Pr[Expnm-atk-1IBE,A (k) = 1] = Pr[b = 0] · Pr[Expind-atk-0IBE,B (k) = 0]
+ Pr[b = 1] · Pr[Expind-atk-1IBE,B (k) = 1] (14)
Pr[Expnm-atk-0IBE,A (k) = 1] = Pr[b = 0] · Pr[Expind-atk-0IBE,B (k) = 1]
+ Pr[b = 1] · Pr[Expind-atk-1IBE,B (k) = 0] (15)
The event b = i, where i ∈ {0, 1}, denotes that the challenger chose xb, encrypted xb and sent the
corresponding ciphertext y∗ as a challenge to the NM-ATK adversary A. Hence,
Advnm-atkIBE,A(k)
(1)= Pr[Expnm-atk-1IBE,A (k) = 1]− Pr[Expnm-atk-0IBE,A (k) = 1]
(2)=
1
2
·
{
(Pr[Expind-atk-0IBE,B (k) = 0] + Pr[Exp
ind-atk-1
IBE,B (k) = 1])
− (Pr[Expind-atk-0IBE,B (k) = 1] + Pr[Expind-atk-1IBE,B (k) = 0])
}
(3)= Pr[Expind-atk-1IBE,B (k) = 1]− Pr[Expind-atk-0IBE,B (k) = 1]
(4)= Advind-atkIBE,B (k)
The equations (1)= and (4)= hold according to the definitions of advantages in NM (3) and IND (1),
respectively. The equation (2)= holds according to Eq. (11) (14) (15). And the equation (3)= holds according
to Eq. (12) (13).
Under the assumption that Advind-atkIBE,B (k) is non-negligible, Adv
nm-atk
IBE,A(k) is also non-negligible. We
reach a contradiction to the hypothesis that IBE is secure in the NM-ATK sense. Thus IBE is also secure
in the IND-ATK sense. This concludes the proof of Theorem 5. uunionsq
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Appendix A. CPA, CCA1 and CCA2 Attack Models
Under CPA the adversary can obtain ciphertexts of plaintexts of her choice. In public key cryptographic
schemes, this attack is unavoidable because the adversary always gets access to the encryption function,
a.k.a. encryption oracle. Under CCA1, in addition to the public key, the adversary is granted access to
an oracle for the decryption function, a.k.a. decryption oracle. The adversary may use this decryption
function only for the period of time before she is given the challenge ciphertext y∗. (This non-adaptive
attack is also named “lunchtime attack”.) Under CCA2, in addition to the public key, the adversary again
gets access to the decryption oracle, but this time she is permitted to use this decryption oracle even on
ciphertexts which are chosen after the challenge ciphertext y∗ is issued. The only restriction is that the
adversary may not ask for the decryption of y∗.
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Appendix B. Particular Attack Models in IBE
In IBE environment, the adversary could be granted more power than adaptive chosen ciphertext attack,
which has been well considered in PKE . The adversary is allowed to attack an arbitrary public key id∗
of her choice. Thus in additional to the adaptive chosen ciphertext attack on id∗, the adversary could
obtain the private keys for any public key of her choice, other than the private key for id∗. She can do
this by performing a series extraction queries to PKG (Private Key generator). The adversary should
still have negligible advantage in breaking the scheme, even with such power.
In this section, we describe two different secure levels of indistinguishability for identity based en-
cryption schemes. They are, adaptive chosen ciphertext security against adaptive chosen identity attack
(IND-ID-CCA2) [5] and adaptive chosen ciphertext security against selective identity attack (IND-sID-
CCA2) [6].
B.1 Adaptive Chosen Identity Security
To achieve adaptive chosen identity security, the scheme should still remain secure under such adaptive
chosen identity attack. The reason is that when an adversary attacks a public key id∗ in IBE , she
might already possess the series private keys of other public keys id1, id2, . . . idn. In this situation, we
must formalize such power into the definition of conventional chosen ciphertext security, which is defined
for PKE . Such queries are named private key extraction queries. We say an identity based encryption
scheme IBE is full-ID secure (IND-ID-CCA2) against adaptive chosen identity attack and adaptive chosen
ciphertext attack, if no polynomially adversary A has a non-negligible advantage to break the scheme in
the following IND-ID-CCA2 game:
– Setup: The challenger takes a security parameter k and runs the Setup algorithm. It gives the
adversary the resulting system parameters param. It keeps the master-key mk to itself.
– Phase 1: The adversary issues queries q1, . . . qm where query qi is one of:
• Extraction query < idi >. The challenger responds by running the Extract algorithm to generate
the private key ski corresponding to the public key idi. It sends ski to the adversary.
• Decryption query < idi, yi >. The challenger responds by running the Extract algorithm to
generate the private key ski corresponding to idi. It then runs the Decrypt algorithm to decrypt
the ciphertext yi using the private key ski. It sends the resulting plaintext xi to the adversary.
These queries may be asked adaptively, that is, each query qi may depend on the replies to q1, . . . qi−1.
– Challenge: Once the adversary decides that Phase 1 is over, it outputs two equal length plaintexts
x0, x1 ∈ M and an identity id∗ with which it wishes to be challenged. The only constraint is that
id∗ did not appear in any private key extraction query in Phase 1. The challenger picks a random
bit b∗ ∈ {0, 1} and sets y∗ = E(param, id∗, xb∗). It sends y∗ as the challenge to the adversary.
– Phase 2: The adversary issues more queries qm+1 where query qi is one of:
• Extraction query < idi >, where idi 6= id∗. Challenger responds as in Phase 1.
• Decryption query < idi, yi >, where (idi, yi) 6= (id∗, y∗). Challenger responds as in Phase 1.
These queries may be asked adaptively as in Phase 1.
– Guess: Finally, the adversary outputs a guess b′ ∈ {0, 1} and wins the game if b′ = b∗.
Such an adversary A is referred as an IND-ID-CCA2 adversary. We say A successfully break the scheme
in the sense of IND-ID-CCA2 if she can distinguish that which plaintext was encrypted with a probability
significantly more than random guess.
B.2 Selective Chosen Identity Security
Besides the adaptive identity attack model defined by Boneh and Franklin, there is also a weaker definition
of security proposed by Canetti, Halevi and Katz [6]. Under this definition, the identity for which the
challenge ciphertext is encrypted is selected by the adversary in advance (say, “selectively”) before the
public key is generated.
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We say that an identity-based encryption scheme IBE is selectively semantic secure against an
adaptive chosen ciphertext attack (IND-sID-CCA2), if no polynomially bounded adversary A has a non-
negligible advantage against the Challenger in the following IND-sID-CCA2 game:
– Select: The adversary A selects a target identity id∗ ∈ {0, 1}∗.
– Setup: The challenger takes a security parameter k and runs the Setup algorithm. It gives the
adversary the resulting system parameters param. It keeps the master-key mk to itself.
– Phase 1: The adversary issues queries q1, . . . qm where query qi is one of:
• Extraction query < idi >, where idi 6= id∗. The challenger responds by running the Extract
algorithm to generate the private key ski corresponding to the public key idi. It sends ski to the
adversary.
• Decryption query < idi, yi >, where (idi, yi) 6= (id∗, y∗). The challenger responds by running the
Extract algorithm to generate the private key ski corresponding to idi. It then runs the Decrypt
algorithm to decrypt the ciphertext yi using the private key ski. It sends the resulting plaintext
xi to the adversary.
These queries may be asked adaptively, that is, each query qi may depend on the replies to q1, . . . qi−1.
– Challenge: Once the adversary decides that Phase 1 is over it outputs two equal length plaintexts
x0, x1 ∈M. The challenger picks a random bit b∗ ∈ {0, 1} and sets y∗ = E(param, id∗, xb∗). It sends
y∗ as the challenge to the adversary.
– Phase 2: The adversary issues more queries qm+1 where query qi is one of:
• Extraction query < idi >, where idi 6= id∗. Challenger responds as in Phase 1.
• Decryption query < idi, yi >, where (idi, yi) 6= (id∗, y∗). Challenger responds as in Phase 1.
These queries may be asked adaptively as in Phase 1.
– Guess: Finally, the adversary outputs a guess b′ ∈ {0, 1} and wins the game if b′ = b∗.
Such an adversary A is referred as an IND-sID-CCA2 adversary. We say A successfully break the
scheme in the sense of IND-sID-CCA2 if she can distinguish that which plaintext was encrypted with a
probability significantly more than random guess.
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